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It is argued that Feynman’s rules for evaluating probabilities, combined
with von Neumann’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism, help avoid
inconsistencies, often associated with quantum theory. The former allows
one to assign probabilities to entire sequences of hypothetical Observers’
experiences, without mentioning the problem of wave function collapse.
The latter limits the Observer’s (e.g., Wigner’s friend’s) participation in
a measurement to the changes produced in material objects, thus leaving
his/her consciousness outside the picture.
.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently there was a renewed interest in in whether quantum theory is internally con-
sistent in its present form, or if new assumptions need to be added to its already well
established principles. The discussion initiated by the authors of [1] was quickly joined,
and various opinions were expressed [2]-[11]. An analysis often centres on two issues, the
“collapse” of the quantum state, and the role and place of a conscious Observer. The two
problems are related. The wave function of the observed system is supposed to undergo a
sudden change once a definite result of the observation becomes known to the Observer. This
change, reminiscent of what happens to a probability distribution in classical statistics once
additional information is received, may have something to do with Observer’s consciousness.
A related question is how an Observer, taking part in the experiment, should consider other
intelligent participants, and whether his/her reasoning would depend on availability of the
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2information about other Observers’ outcomes [1], or merely on being aware of the other
measurements being made. One extreme view includes consciousness into a quantum me-
chanical calculation directly [12], or grants it an active role in the reshaping of the collapsed
wave function [13]. On the other extreme, one finds theories aiming at denying the Observer
any special status at all as happens, for example, in the consistent histories approach (CHA)
[5], [14]. One cannot help wishing for a compromise position. Would it be possible to have a
universal quantum theory centred on the Observer’s subjective perceptions, and yet apply-
ing its mathematical apparatus only to material objects, whenever Observer’s probability
are calculated? One might look for an answer in the literature.
The question was discussed by Bohr [15] and later by von Neumann in his monograph
[16], both invoking the principle of psycho-physical parallelism. The principle establishes a
correspondence between “extra-physical process of subjective perception” and “equivalent
physical processes”, as described by the Observer’s theory. This is a delicate balancing act.
According to von Neumann [16], its success depends not on providing a detailed explanation
of the act of human perception, but on being able to move the boundary between “physical”
and “extra-physical” in an arbitrary manner, deeper into the Observer’s body, or further
out towards the observed system. Von Neumann’s discussion covered mostly a single mea-
surement, made on a system in an already known quantum state.
However, current discussions (see, e.g., [1]-[11]) often consider several consecutive observa-
tions, which involve more than one Observer. An approach to such situations was outlined
in Feynman’s undergraduate text [17], rarely mentioned in the present context. Feynman’s
general principles [17] are quite simple. To find the probability of a sequence of observed
events, one needs to evaluate the amplitude for each route, by multiplying the amplitudes
for each part of the route, add up the amplitudes, if the routes cannot be told apart, and
take the absolute square of the sum. Feynman warns against thinking “in terms of ‘particle
waves’”, and his recipe does not need to address the ”collapse” problem. Nor is the role of
consciousness discussed in a great detail. Sect. 2.6 of [17] hints at the importance of the
“traces left” by a phenomenon, and leaves the problem in that form.
The purpose of this paper is to establish whether the principles of [16] and [17] are suffi-
cient to make an intelligent Observer a client and a beneficiary of quantum theory, at the
same time keping the subject of consciousness outside the theory’s scope. We will also ask
whether, with the first task achieved, the theory is able to provide unequivocal answers in
3the situations where its consistency is questioned.
In Sect. II we adopt Feynman’s recipe [17] to describe a series of consecutive quantum
measurements. In Sect. III we demonstrate the equivalence between this “static” view, and
a “evolutionist” picture, in which an initial quantum state is seen as undergoing a unitary
evolution, interrupted by Observers’ interventions. Sect. IV underlines a distinction between
Observer’s consciousness, and his/her material memory, thus setting a framework for our
analysis. In Section V we consider the case of two Observers, and three possible scenarios
for their experiment. In Sect.VI we summarise our preliminary conclusions. Section VII
revisits the Wigner’s friend problem of Ref.[13]. In Sect. VIII we discuss an interference
experiment, similar to that proposed in [18]. In Sect. IX we show how von Neumann bound-
ary can be placed “at the level of the observed system” in a general case. Sect. X describes
a more efficient way to calculate the probabilities, in which all but the last Observers are
represented by their unobserved probes. In Sect. XI we discuss certain similarities and
differences between our analysis, and the consistent histories approach of [14]. Sect. XII
contains our conclusions.
II. QUANTUM RULES. THE “ENTIRE HISTORY” VIEW.
Let us assume that L + 1 Observers decide to make L + 1 measurements on particular
parts of a quantum system, with which they associates a N -dimensional Hilbert space. If
L+1 quantities Q`, ` = 0, 1, 2, ..., L, need to be measured at different times t = t`, t` > t`−1,
one associates with each Q` a discrete orthonormal basis |q`n`〉, n` = 1, ...N , and a Hermitian
operator, Qˆ`, whose eigenvalues Q`m` , m` = 1...M` may be degenerate, M` ≤ N ,
Qˆ` =
M∑`
m`=1
Q`m`Πˆ
`
m`
, Πˆ`m` ≡
N∑
n`=1
∆
(
Q`m` − 〈q`n` |Qˆ`|q`n`〉
)
|q`n`〉〈q`n` |. (1)
We define ∆(x− y) ≡ 1 for x = y, and 0 otherwise, so that a Πˆ`m` projects onto the eigen-
subspace of the eigenvalue Q`m` . Observers’ outcomes must coincide with the eigenvalues of
the operators Qˆ`, and one wishes to evaluate the probabilities P (QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q0m0)
of obtaining a series of outcomes QLmL ... ← Q`m` ... ← Q0m0 . The initial measurement (also
known as the preparation) must determine the initial state |q1i1〉 unambiguously, Q0m0 ↔ |q0n0〉,
and we will always assume that Q0m0 is non-degenerate.
The recipe for constructing the probabilities P (QLmL ... ← Q`m` .... ← Q0m0) is as follows [17].
4First, one constructs all virtual (Feynman) paths, {qLnL ... ← q`n` ... ← q0n0}, connecting the
eigenstates |q`i`〉, and ascribes to them probability amplitudes
A(qLnL ...← q`n` ← q0n0) =
L∏
`=1
〈q`n`|Uˆ(t`, t`−1)|q`−1n`−1〉. (2)
where Uˆ(t′, t) is the system’s evolution operator.
Then one sums the amplitudes in Eq.(2) over the degeneracies of all but the last eigenvalues,
thus obtaining the “real” paths, {qLnL ... ← Q`m` ... ← q0n0}, endowed with the probability
amplitudes
A˜(qLnL ...← Q`m` ...← q0n0) =
N∑
n1,,...nL−1=1
[
L−1∏
`=1
∆
(
Q`m` − 〈q`n` |Qˆ``|q`n`〉
)]
A(qLnL ...← q`n` ...← q0i0), (3)
as well as the probabilities
p(qLnL ...← Q`m` ...← q0n0) ≡ |A˜(qLnL ...← Q`m` ...← q0n0)|2. (4)
Finally, one sums the probabilities in Eq.(4) over the degeneracies of the last QˆL, to obtain
P (QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q0m0) =
N∑
nL=1
∆
(
QLmL − 〈qLnL|QˆL|qLnL〉
)
p(qLnL ...← Q`m` ...← q0n0) (5)
In general, the situation is non-Markovian - the probability p(qLnL ...← Q`m` ...← q0n0) does not
factorise into
∏L
`=1 p(Q
`
m`
−Q`−1m`−1), unless all the eigenvalues are non-degenerate, M` = N .
For this reason, the amplitude A˜(qLnL ...← Q`m` ...← q0n0) has to refer to the entire experiment,
which starts with the preparation at t = t0, and end with the last observation made at t = tL.
Finally, we need to assume that the probabilities (5) refer to the Observers’ experiences,
and not to the statements like “a physical quantity has a certain value” [16]. The situation
should, therefore, be like this. In an experiment, involving several steps, each participant
can perceive one of his/her possible outcomes, Q`m` . Equations (2)-(5) give a recipe for
calculating the likelihoods of all possible sequences of the perceived outcomes one at a time.
The recipe consists in calculating matrix elements of unitary operators, multiplying the
results, and adding the products, as appropriate. There is no mention of a “state evolving
throughout experiment”, neither a need to account for the future development of such a
state, after the experiment is finished at t = tL. One does not need to care about what the
participants may think or know about each other. The calculation could be made by an
5Alice, who does not take part in the experiment, and remains in the comfort of her office.
Her results will apply to any L+ 1 Observers who may or may not communicate with each
other, as well as to the same Observer, who performs all L+1 measurements single handedly.
However, the problem can also be formulated in a different manner.
III. QUANTUM RULES. THE “EVOLUTIONIST” VIEW
Equation (5) can be written in a more familiar way. Defining a partial evolution operator
as
Uˆ(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← q0m0) ≡ Uˆ(tL, tL−1)
L−1∏
`=1
Πˆ`m`Uˆ(t`, t`−1), (6)
with a property that
ML−1...M1∑
mL−1...m1=1
Uˆ(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1) = Uˆ(tL, t0), (7)
and a projector onto the initial state, ρˆ0 ≡ |q0n0〉〈q0n0|, one can construct a family of M1 ×
M2...×ML−1 density operators (mixed states)
ρ(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1 , ρ0) ≡ (8)
Uˆ(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1)ρˆ0Uˆ †(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1),
where Uˆ † is the hermitian conjugate of Uˆ . Now the probabilities in Eq.(5) can be obtained
just as well by taking a trace,
P (QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q0m0) = tr
[
ΠˆLmLρ(Q
L−1
mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1 , ρ0)
]
(9)
Equation (9) remains valid for a more general initial state,
ρ0 =
∑
ν
wν |qν0〉〈qν0 |, (10)
where the system is prepared in a state |qν0〉 with a probability wν , and |qν0〉 are any nor-
malised, yet not necessarily orthogonal states.
This is a dynamic picture. In Eq.(8) the initial state state (9) can be seen as evolving until
the time of the last observation, yet the evolution is not unitary,
Uˆ †(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1)Uˆ(QL−1mL−1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1) = (11)
Πˆ1†m1(t1)...× Πˆ(L−1)†mL−1 ΠˆL−1mL−1 ...× Πˆ1m1(t1) 6= 1ˆ.
6In total, there are M1 × M2... × ML−1 such evolutions, and for someone who wishes to
associate quantum mechanics with uninterrupted unitary evolution in Eq.(7), Eqs.(9)-(11)
may present a conceptual problem. A wave function seen as a substance in continuous flow
(7), decimated each time a conscious Observer makes an enquiry and perceives an outcome,
presents a rather bizarre picture.
This problem does not arise in the “static” view, outlined at the end of the previous Section.
In the following, we will accept the rules of Sect.II as the basic axioms of quantum theory,
and treat Eqs.(9) - Eqs.(11) as their consequences [19], which can be derived and used, e.g.,
for computational convenience.
IV. CONSCIOUSNESS, MEMORY AND MATERIAL RECORDS
In the context of the previous Section, it is only natural to wonder how an act of per-
ceiving an outcome could succeed in replacing a unitary evolution (7) by a non-unitary one
in Eq.(11). With Observer’s consciousness now drawn into the discussion, there are at least
two possibilities. One can
i) include Observer’s consciousness into the scope of quantum theory [12]. This is known to
lead to a contradiction with what we seem to know about intelligent beings [13].
ii) exclude consciousness from the analysis completely, reduce its role to that of an external
client, and treat the content of Sect.II as a rule book, with no obligation to give any expla-
nations. This appears to be in line with the approach outlined in [17], and articulated in
more detail in [19].
A further insight can, however, be gained at the cost of making additional assumptions.
Consider first an example in which classical physics is used to determine the trajectory of a
tennis ball, after a tennis player sends it back to the partner’s half of the court. The player’s
consciousness is evidently involved - he or she sees the ball coming, chooses the moment
and the angle, and finally strikes the ball with the racket. There are many aspects clearly
outside the remit of classical mechanics, yet mechanics does not fail. Fortunately, to predict
the ball’s trajectory one does not need to understand the mental processes which led to the
force being exerted. Of the whole complex occurrence classical mechanics requires only the
things firmly within the theory’s scope - the ball’s position and velocity, and the force acting
at the time it is being hit.
7Using this analogy, one can try to limit a complex act of Observer’s perception to its conse-
quences in the inanimate material world. While the details of the act itself are outside the
quantum theory’s scope, its consequences can be discussed and successfully used in practice.
In order to do so, we will draw a distinction between Observers consciousness (fully outside
our analysis) and his/her material memory (subject to our discussion) [20]. The act of reg-
istering an outcome will be seen as accompanied by a change in the state of the Observer’s
memory’s, M, i.e., by production of a material record.
Furthermore, quantum theory will be expected to apply to all material objects regardless
of their size and complexity. It will be able, therefore, to treat the change in the memory’s
state without questioning how this change came about, just as classical mechanics does not
need to question the chain of the player’s decisions, leading to the force being exerted on
the ball. The appearance of this additional (memory’s) degree of freedom, entangled with
the system, will enlarge the Hilbert space used in the calculation of Sect.II, alter the de-
generacies of the measured eigenvalues, and ultimately give different answers, depending on
whether an Observer perceives his outcome or not. It will also follow that without producing
such a record an act of observation “should not count”, just as a movement which misses
the ball, or a movement contemplated yet not carried out, would have no effect on the ball’s
trajectory.
We will need, therefore, to distinguish three different developments. First, an Observer
couples his/her visible probe D to the studied quantum system S at t = τ (we consider all
interactions to be instantaneous, and the system itself invisible to the naked eye). Then,
at a tr > τ , he/she registers the state of the probe, which produces a record in his/her
memory. Later still, at tp ≥ tr the Observer perceives the outcome, i.e., becomes aware of
the impression left in his/her memory. This can happen at the time of the registration, or
at later time, when the Observer consults his/her memory again. The last step may seem
redundant, but is necessary for our analysis. The probabilities in Sect.II, we recall, refer to
the moments the Observers are expected to perceive their outcomes.
V. AN EXAMPLE WITH ONLY TWO PARTICIPANTS
As an illustration, consider only two Observers, subsequently called F and W, a two-level
system, S, two measuring devices (probes) DF,W , visible to both Observers, and two sets of
8individual memories, MF and MW . The experiment consists in preparing the composite
system in a state |Φ0〉 ≡ |µW0 〉|µF0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉 at t0 = 0. At t = τF > 0 F switches on a
coupling which, after a brief interaction, entangles DF with S, using a particular basis |sF1,2〉
according to (for details see the Appendix)
|dF0 〉|s0〉 → 〈sF1 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉|dF1 〉|sF1 〉+ 〈sF2 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉|dF2 〉|sF2 〉, (12)
where UˆS(τF , t0) is the system’s evolution operator 〈sFj |sFi 〉 = δij, and 〈dFj |dFi 〉 = δij. Note
that the device DF can be as complex as on wishes, bearing in mind that only two of its
states |d1〉 and |d2〉, are involved in the experiment. (For example, an outcome could be a
sheet o paper, on which a printer may write ”yes” or a ”no”, but not T.S. Eliot’s Fourth
Quartet. A similar situation occurs, for example, in cold matter physics, where only two
states of a complex Rb atom are involved in the cooling experiment [21].)
Then at t = tFr > τ
F , F “registers his result” (we might say “looks at the probe”) which, by
means beyond our knowledge, changes the state of his memory according to
|µF0 〉|dF 〉 → 〈dF1 |dF 〉|µF1 〉|dF1 〉+ 〈dF2 |dF 〉|µF2 〉|dF2 〉, (13)
where |dF 〉 is any state of the F’s probe, and 〈µFj |µFi 〉 = δij. After that, at
t1 ≡ tFp ≥ tFr , (14)
F accesses his memory (we do not need to know how), and becomes aware of (perceives) his
outcome, a ”yesF” or a ”noF”.
Finally, the second Observer, W, is also able to measure the system, F’s probe, or their
composite, by coupling his own visible device DW at t = τW > tWr , registering the result
at tWr > τ
W , and becoming aware of his outcome (perceiving his outcome) yesW or a noW
upon consulting his memory immediately after, at
t2 ≡ tWp = tWr + , → 0. (15)
For this W will need a probe with four orthogonal states |dWj 〉, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, a four-state
orthogonal basis for the composite system + F’s probe, e.g.,
|φW1 〉 = α|sW1 〉|dF1 〉+ β|sW2 〉|dF2 〉, |φW2 〉 = β∗|sW1 〉|dF1 〉 − α∗|sW2 〉|dF2 〉, (16)
|φW3 〉 = α|sW1 〉|dF2 〉+ β|sW2 〉|dF1 〉, |φW4 〉 = β∗|sW1 〉|dF2 〉 − α∗|sW2 〉|dF1 〉,
9where 〈sWj |sWi 〉 = δij and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, and a coupling which entangles W’s probe with
the composite according to
|dW0 〉|φ〉 →
4∑
j=1
〈φWj |φ〉|dWj 〉|φWj 〉, (17)
where |φ〉 is any state of the composite (see Appendix). Finally, W registers the state of his
probe according to
|µF0 〉|dW 〉 →
4∑
j=1
〈dWj |dW 〉|µWj 〉|dWj 〉. (18)
To apply the rules of Sect.II we note that the acts of coupling, (12) and (17), and the acts
of registering, (13) and (18), must be described by the evolution operators Uˆ in Eq.(3), now
acting in the Hilbert space of a composite {spin +F’s probe+ F’s memory+ W’s probe +
W’s memory}. Different outcomes, perceived by F and W, are in one-to-one correspondence
with distinct eigenvalues of operators QˆF and QˆW , acting in the Hilbert spaces of F’s and
W’s memories, respectively. Equation (5) will then give the probabilities of the possible
outcomes, as perceived by the Observers. In the following we will assume that the probes
and the memories, unlike the system, have no own dynamics, and consider several possible
scenarios.
Scenario (A): F does not register his outcome, and W registers and perceives his. If so, F’s
probe is coupled to the system as in Eq.(12), but his memory remains unchanged, since (13)
has not been applied. W’s perceived outcomes can be represented, e.g., by an operator
QˆW = |µW1 〉〈µW1 |+ 2|µW2 〉〈µW2 |+ 3[|µW3 〉〈µW3 |+ |µW4 〉〈µW4 |], (19)
with the eigenvalues interpreted as QW1 = 1 → yesW , QW2 = 2 → noW , and QW3 = 3 →
{not sure}W . By this we mean that the probabilities given by Eq.(5) for the eigenvalues
QWi are the actual odds on W saying that his experiment produced an outcome yes, no,
or neither of the two. With F’s memory not involved, and remaining in its initial state
|µF0 〉, the basis states of the joint system {system+F’s probe+W’s probe+W’s memory } are
conveniently chosen as
|qWijk〉 = |µWk 〉|dWj 〉|φWi 〉, i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, 4, (20)
where |φW
i
〉 ≡ UˆS(tWp , τW )|φWi 〉 and UˆS(tWp , τW ) is the system’s evolution operator. We
will need the matrix elements, 〈qWijk|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|µW0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉, where Uˆ(tWp , t0) takes into
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account the developments (12), (17), and (18), but not (13). The matrix elements are easily
evaluated, and we find
t0	
tFr	
tWr,p	
τF	
τW	
Preparation	
W’s	probe	
	coupled	
F’s	probe	coupled	
F	registers	
W	registers	and	perceives	
|q
W111 >	
|q
W222 >	
|q
W333 >	
|q
W
444 >	
|q
W1111 >	
|q
W1121 >	
|q
W2212 >	
|q
W2222 >	
|q
W3313 >	
|q
W3323 >	
|q
W4414 >	
|q
W4424 >	
|qF111>	 |qF222>	
|q
W1111 >	
|q
W1121 >	
|q
W2212 >	
|q
W2222 >	
|q
W3313 >	
|q
W3323 >	
|q
W4414 >	
|q
W4424 >	
|Φ0>	 |Φ0>	 |Φ0>	
Tim
e	
a)	 b)	 c)	
tFp	 F	perceives	
yesW	 noW	 not	sureW	yes W	
no
W	
not	
sure W	
Figure 1: Virtual paths in case a) F does not register, nor perceive his outcome, and W perceives
his outcome; b) both F and W register and perceive their respective outcomes; c) F only registers
his outcome, and W registers and perceives his. In the scenario a) W sees interference on his results.
In b) and c) this interference is destroyed, since F’s memory carries a record of his outcome, even
if it has not been perceived.
〈qWij1|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|µW0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉 = δi1δj1[α∗AS1 + β∗AS4 ] (21)
〈qWij2|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|µW0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉 = δi2δj2[βAS1 − αAS4 ],
〈qWij3|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|µW0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉 = δi3δj3[α∗AS2 + β∗AS3 ],
〈qWij4|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|µW0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉 = δi4δj4[βAS2 − αAS3 ],
where
AS1 ≡ 〈sW1 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF1 〉〈sF1 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉, (22)
AS2 ≡ 〈sW1 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF2 〉〈sF2 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉,
AS3 ≡ 〈sW2 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF1 〉〈sF1 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉,
AS4 ≡ 〈sW2 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF2 〉〈sF2 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉.
11
The four paths in the 64-dimensional Hilbert space of the composite {system+F’s probe+W’s
probe+W’s memory } with non-zero amplitudes are shown in Fig.1a. Then, by (5), we have
P1(yes
W ) = |α∗AS1 + β∗AS4 |2 = |α|2|AS1 |2 + |β|2|AS4 |2 + 2Re[α∗βASAs∗4 ], (23)
P1(no
W ) = |βAS1 − αAS4 |2,= |β|2|AS1 |2 + |α|2|AS4 |2 − 2Re[α∗βASAs∗4 ]
P1({not sure}W ) = |α∗AS2 + β∗AS3 |2 + |βAS2 − αA34|2.
These three probabilities add up to one, as they should, since
∑4
i=1 |ASi |2 = 1, |α|2+|β|2 = 1,
and 〈s0|s0〉 = 1.
Scenario (B): Both F and W register and perceive their outcomes. Next consider the case
where both F and W become aware of their outcomes at the same time the outcomes become
recorded in their memories,
tFp = t
F
r + , → 0. (24)
There are now two sets of possible outcomes and, according to Eqs.(2)-(5), we need the
matrix elements of two operators, Uˆ(tFp , t0), which takes into account developments (12)
and (13), and Uˆ(tWp , t
F
p ), which includes (17) and (18). To describe F’s relation with his
memory, we will use an operator
QˆF = |µF1 〉〈µF1 |+ 2|µF2 〉〈µF2 |, (25)
whose eigenvalues are interpreted as QF1 = 1→ yesF , QF2 = 2→ noF . Since W’s probe and
memory remain unchanged until τW > tFp we can choose eigenstates of Qˆ
F to be
|qFijk〉 = |µW0 〉|µFk 〉|dFj 〉|dW0 〉|sFi 〉, i, j, k = 1, 2, (26)
where |sFi 〉 ≡ UˆS(tFp , τF )|sFi 〉. To include F’s memory (no longer idle) in the calculation of
W’s probabilities, we choose the eigenstates of QˆW in Eq.(19) in the form
|qWijkl〉 = |µWl 〉|µFk 〉|dWj 〉|φWi 〉, i, j, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, k = 1, 2. (27)
With this, we have
〈qFijk|Uˆ(tFp , t0)|µF0 〉|dF0 〉|s0〉 = δijδjk〈sFi |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉, (28)
〈qWi′j′k′l′|Uˆ(tWp , tFp )|qFijk〉 = δi′j′δj′l′δk′k〈φWi′ |UˆS(τW , τF )|sFi 〉|dFi 〉, (29)
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so that there are eight final states |qWi′i′k′i′〉, which can be reached from the initial |Φ0〉 via
eight paths shown in Fig.1b. In particular we have
P (yesW , yesF ) = |〈qW1111|Uˆ(tWp , tFp )|qF111〉〈qF111|Uˆ(tFp , t0)|Φ0〉|2 = |α|2|AS1 |2, (30)
P (yesW , noF ) = |〈qW1121|Uˆ(tWp , tFp )|qF222〉〈qF222|Uˆ(tFp , t0)|Φ0〉|2 = |β|2|AS4 |2,
where the amplitudes AS1,2 are defined in Eqs.(22). Thus, the net probability of W perceiving
a result yesW ,
P2(yes
W ) = P (yesW , yesF ) + P (yesW , noF ) = |α|2|AS1 |2 + |β|2|AS4 |2, (31)
is different from the one in Eq.(23), apparently changed by the fact that F had previously
perceived his outcome.
Scenario (C): F only registers his outcome, and W registers and perceives his. We would have
failed in our task of setting Observer’s consciousness aside, if a mere act of F’s perception
could alter W’s statistics. There is, however, no danger of that happening, as seen from the
example where F’s memory carries a record of his result, but F is not supposed to perceive
it before the experiment is finished. According to the rules of Sect.II, this case is formally
different from the already discussed scenarios (A) and (B). Indeed, there is only one (W’s)
set of perceived outcomes (yesW , noW , or {not sure}W ), and eight paths connecting |Φ0〉
with the final states |qWiiki〉, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, k = 1, 2, shown in Fig.1c. Now the probability of
W perceiving an outcome yesW is
P3(yes
W ) = |〈qW1111|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|Φ0〉|2 + |〈qW1121|Uˆ(tWp , t0)|Φ0〉|2 = |α|2|AS1 |2 + |β|2|AS4 |2, (32)
which is the same as P2(yes
W ) in Eq.(31), but differs from P1(yes
W ) in Eq.(23) by the
absence of the interfering term 2Re
[
αβ∗AS1A
s∗
4
]
.
VI. FEYNMAN’S PHOTON, FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, DESTROYED
RECORDS, AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
A brief summary is in order. A material record is carried by a system, to which the
calculation of Sect.II ascribes a different orthogonal state, for each scenario, considered
there. The world “material” is chosen to emphasise that the recording system is a material
object, and nothing essential for calculating the probabilities is consigned to the Observer’s
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consciousness, where quantum theory has no jurisdiction. A simple example of such a record
was given by Feynman in [17] where, in a double-slit experiment with electrons, a photon
would end up in distinguishable (orthogonal) states, depending on the slit at which it was
scattered by the passing particle. This alone will destroy the interference pattern on the
screen even if the photon is never detected - “At the end of the process you may say that
you ’don’t want to look at the photon. That’s your business, but you still do not add the
amplitudes...”[17].
The case of the previous Section are conceptually similar to the above example, with F’s
memory playing the role of Feynman’s photon. Comparing the scenarios A and B, we note
that quantum theory automatically accounts for the effect of previous (F’s) perceptions
on the final (W’s) statistics provided the act o perception is accompanied by creation of a
record in a material object representing Observers memory. As such, the memory is akin to
any other object, carrying information about the observation’s outcome. For example, an
Observer, not wishing to rely only on his/her memory, could decide to leave an additional
note, e.g., by preparing a spin up a given axis, if the result is a yes, or down that axis, if
it is a no. In addition, he/she may decide to communicate the outcome to a friend, whose
memory will be changed accordingly upon receiving this information. In all these cases,
quantum mechanics will need only to take into account the records’ degrees of freedom, in
order to be able to make the correct prediction using the rules of Sect.II. Moreover, as our
scenario C shows, the actual act of perception is not necessary. Even if a record, accessible to
an Observer in principle [17] in future, is created by an inanimate device, the final statistics
will look as if the outcome of and intermediate measurement had been experienced.
Feynman’s example may have interesting implications for an experiment where a macroscopic
(F’s) probe becomes entangled with a small quantum system, such as an atom, or a spin,
and W attempts to erase the information by entangling his probe to both F’s probe and the
system, as in our scenario B. There W failed to do so, because of the persisting record in F’s
memory. But the same result would have been obtained even without F present, provided
a single photon had been scattered by F’s probe, and then escaped W’s manipulations.
Isolating a macroscopic device from all microscopic influences may be an extremely difficult
task, even in the absence of a macroscopic environment, whose presence is often assumed in
decoherence theories [22].
One can still ask what would happen if W manages to entangle the system, F’s probe, F’s
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memory, the memory of F’s friend with whom F shared his outcome, and all the photons
which were scattered during the experiment? At least, there is no formal contradiction. With
all material records destroyed, the knowledge of what actually happened in the experiment
will be irretrievably lost. This answer relies on an assumption we had to make, namely that
no information about the physical world can be stored anywhere beyond the reach of the
theory [20]. There is an agrrement with purely classical reasoning - in a classical world,
with all witnesses dead, and all records destroyed it should be impossible to know what did
actually happen.
Finally, one may ask “did the information about F’s outcome exist before W destroyed all the
records?”. We recall that in the example of the previous Section quantum mechanics provides
probabilities for three hypothetical sequences of actual events. According to Feynman [17],
a probability is desired for when the experiment is ’finished’, i.e., when W perceives his
outcome at t = tWp . In the scenario (A), F had an opportunity to look at his probe and
obtain his outcome at any τF < t < τW , but missed it. Were he to take this opportunity,
we would be in the scenario (B). Finally, if a perceivable record were to be made without
F’s knowledge, the theory would consider scenario (C), where there remains, at least in
principle [17], a possibility of learning about the outcome in future, at some t > tWp .
VII. THE WIGNER’S FRIEND PROBLEM
In a much cited paper [13], Wigner (W) considered the following situation. A quantum
system S, initially is a state ψ = α|s1〉 + β|s2〉, is coupled to a probe D, and becomes
entangled with it. The state of the composite S+D becomes φ = α|d1〉|s1〉 + β|d2〉|s2〉,
which is fully acceptable so far. If the probe is replaced by a conscious Observer, Wigner’s
Friend (F), so that the states |d1〉 and |d2〉 correspond to him/her having seen the system in
conditions |s1〉 and |s2〉, respectively, the situation changes. Should Wigner ask his Friend
about the condition of S a when he saw it, F has to give one of the two possible answers.
The entangled state no longer makes sense, since it corresponds to neither |s1〉 , nor |s2〉,
and appears to imply that the “friend was in a state of suspended animation”[13] until
asked by Wigner. The solution proposed in [13] was to suggest that the unsuitable state φ
be replaced by a mixture |α|2|d1〉|s1〉〈d1|〈s1|+ |β|2|d2〉|s2〉〈d2|〈s2|, which now describes two
exclusive alternatives available to F. This change, concludes Wigner, must be effected by
15
Friend’s consciousness exerting influence upon physical world, hence the necessity to make
quantum equations of motion “grossly non-linear if conscious beings enter the picture” [13].
Let us reconsider the situation in a slightly different, yet equivalent form, after making one
additional assumption. It is contrary to our experience that a person should be conscious of
all information stored in his/her memory at all times. The sequence of events, about which
W wants to make predictions, must therefore look like this. At t = t0, F prepares the system
and his probe, and keeps them apart until t = t1. At t1, he couples his probe to the system,
looks at the probe, and consigns the outcome to his memory M. He then goes on thinking
about unrelated matters, such as football or the state of the economy. After t1, S and D
may interact with each other, but not with M. At a t = t2 > t1, W asks F about what he
saw at t = t1, so F has to consult his memory again, before coming up with an answer.
The situation is easily analysed by using the prescriptions of Sect.II. We should consider
a composite {system+F’s probe+F’s memory}. (If F were to make other records of his
outcome, these would need to be included as well). As before, F’s perceived outcomes will
be yes or no, F’s memory will couple to the probe as |µ0〉|d〉 → 〈d1|d〉|d1〉|µ1〉+〈d2|d〉|d2〉|µ2〉,
and the eigenvalues of F’s operator Qˆ = |µ1〉〈µ1|+2|µ2〉〈µ2| will be interpreted as Q1 = 1→
yes and Q2 = 2 → no. There are two perceived outcomes, one at t = t1, when the result
was first registered, and one at t = t2, when Friend needs to answer Wigner’s question. We
require two sets of states for the composite,
|q(1)ijk〉 = |µk〉|dj〉|si〉, i, l, k,= 1, 2, (33)
and
|q(2)ik 〉 = |µk〉|ϕi〉, i, k = 1, 2, ϕi ≡ UˆD+S(t2, t1)|di〉|si〉. (34)
In (33) we have assumed that F’s probe and the system do not interact before t1, and the
evolution operator UˆD+S(t2, t1) in (33) accounts for any interaction between S and D that
may occur after F becomes aware of his outcome for the first time. For the amplitudes for
the virtual paths {q(2)i′k′ ← q(1)ijk ← µ0d0s0} we have
A(q
(2)
i′k′ ← q(1)ijk ← µ0d0s0) = 〈q(2)i′k′|Uˆ(t2, t1)|q(1)ijk〉〈q(1)ijk|Uˆ(t1, t0)|µ0〉|d0〉|s0〉 (35)
= δkk′δii′δjkδij〈si|UˆS(t1, t0)|s0〉
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There are two virtual paths with non-zero amplitudes, and the probabilities of F perceiving
outcomes yes1,2/no1,2 at t1,2 are
P (yes2, yes1) = |A(q(2)11 ← q(1)111 ← µ0d0s0)|2 = |〈s1|UˆS(t1, t0)|s0〉|2, (36)
P (yes2, no1) = |A(q(2)12 ← q(1)222 ← µ0d0s0)|2 = 0,
P (no2, yes1) = |A(q(2)21 ← q(1)111 ← µ0d0s0)|2 = 0,
P (no2, no1) = |A(q(2)22 ← q(1)222 ← µ0d0s0)|2 = |〈s2|UˆS(t1, t0)|s0〉|2,
which is the expected result. First, Friend looks at his probe and consigns the outcome to
his memory. When asked about it by Wigner, F consults the memory (or any other material
record he may have produced) and gives an honest reply. Quantum mechanics duly takes
notice of any records produced, and if the rules of Sect.II are accepted as its basic principle,
no revision or extension of the existing formalism is required.
VIII. AN INTERFERENCE GEDANKENEXPERIMENT
In a 1995 paper [18], Deutsch, very much in the spirit of Section III, studied the ”col-
lapse” of the wave function, i.e., the process whereby a superposition
∑
ci|Φi〉 goes into a
single term, say, |Φi0〉, which corresponds to the actually observed value of the measured
operator. In a slightly simplified form, the proposed experiment consists of coupling a sys-
tem S to a probe D, then measuring an operator, able to detect whether the coupling took
place, storing the outcome, and then reversing the system-probe evolution. In the scheme
of [18], coupling of the probe is equivalent to “subsystem D measuring subsystem S”, and
if this measurement is ”complete”, the state of {S + D} would collapse [18], and will not
be restored to its initial form by the reversed evolution. The experiment is finished with
measuring S +D, in a different basis, so that the statistics of this last measurement would
indicate whether the composite {S+D} ends up in a pure, or in a mixed state. In particular,
one might ask whether knowing that the first measurement took place, but not its outcome,
would have and effect on the statistics of the last measurement.
Unlike the author of [18], we are not interested in the virtues, or otherwise, of the Copen-
hagen and Everett’s many-world interpretations. Our aim is to demonstrate that by ap-
plying the rules of Sect.II, we can get a definite answer without mentioning either of the
two schools of thought directly. As before, we will employ two Observers, F and W, the
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former to establish that the measurement coupling did take place, and the latter to collect
the final statistics. We will require three probes, D, DF and DW , a two-level system S,
and assume that only S has its own nontrivial dynamics. As before, at t0 = 0 a composite
{system+probe+F’s probe+W’s probe+F’s memory+W’s memory } is prepared in an initial
state
|Φ0〉 = |µW0 〉|µF0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|d0〉|s0〉. (37)
Then at τ > t0, S is entangled with the probe D, according to
|d0〉|s〉 → 〈s1|s〉|d1〉|s1〉+ 〈s2|s〉|d2〉|s2〉, (38)
〈sj|si〉 = δij, i = 1, 2, 〈dn|dm〉 = δmn, m, n = 0, 1, 2.
Later still, at t1 > τ , F’s probe is entangled with the composite {S+D}, and F immediately
registers and perceives his outcome. This development is described as
|µF0 〉|dF0 〉|φ〉 → |µF1 〉|dF1 〉 [α11|d1〉|s1〉+ α22|d2〉|s2〉] + (39)
|µF2 〉|dF2 〉
[
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=0
(1− δj1δi1)(1− δj2δi2)αij|dj〉|si〉
]
,
where |φ〉 is an arbitrary state of the {S + D}, and αij ≡ 〈dj|〈si|φ〉, i = 1, 2, j = 0, 1, 2.
Equation (39) makes F a reliable witness - his memory is in a state |µF1 〉 if the coupling
(38) was applied (coupling on), and in a distinguishable state |µF2 〉, if it was not (coupling
off). After t1, the evolution of S and D, up to the moment F couples his probe, is reversed.
Until t = t1 + (t1 − τ) the system’s evolution operator is UˆS(2t1 − τ, t1) = [UˆS]−1(t1, τ). At
t = 2t1 − τ the coupling (38) is reversed, to wit
|di〉|si〉 → |d0〉|si〉, i = 1, 2. (40)
From t = 2t1 − τ to t2 = 2t1, at which W perceives his outcome, we have UˆS(t2, 2t1 − τ) =
[UˆS]−1(τ, 0). At t2 = 2t1, W may decide to explore the odds on finding the {S +D} in the
initial state |d0〉|s0〉, P (back to |d0〉|s0〉), by coupling and registering his probe according to
|µW0 〉|dW0 〉|φS+D〉 → 〈s0|〈d0||φS+D〉 × |µW1 〉|dW1 〉|s0〉|d0〉+ ..., (41)
where |φS+D〉 is an arbitrary state of the {S+D}, and we omitted the terms, containing the
five remaining orthogonal states of the composite. If the entanglement of probe D with S did
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not constitute a “complete measurement” [from (39) we know that the interaction between
S and D did take place], the composite will be restored to |d0〉|s0〉 with a probability
P1(back to |d0〉|s0〉) =
[
|〈s1|UˆS(τ, 0)|s0〉|2 + |〈s2|UˆS(τ, 0)|s0〉|2
]2
= 〈s0|s0〉2 = 1. (42)
If a complete measurement takes place, at t = t1, the “collapsed state” of the composite will
have to be either UˆS(t1, τ)|s1〉|d1〉, with a probability |〈s1|UˆS(τ)|s0〉|2, or UˆS(t1, τ)|s2〉|d2〉,
with a probability |〈s2|UˆS(τ)|s0〉|2, and W’s odds,
P2(back to |d0〉|s0〉) = |〈s1|UˆS(τ, 0)|s0〉|4 + |〈s2|UˆS(τ, 0)|s0〉|4, (43)
will differ from P1 in (42) by an interference term P1(back to |d0〉|s0〉) −
P2(back to |d0〉|s0〉) = 2|〈s1|UˆS(τ)|s0〉|2|〈s1|UˆS(τ)|s0〉|2. Thus, the question is whether Eq.
(42) or Eq. (43) will yield the correct answer, given that we know that the “subsystem D
has measured the subsystem S at t = τ ,” but do not know the measurement’s outcome?
The answer, easily found by applying the rules of Sect.II, is shorter than the question it
took us some time to formulate. Figure 2 shows two virtual paths connecting the initial
and the final states with non-zero the amplitudes (i = 1, 2)
Ai ≡ 〈µW1 |〈µF1 |〈dW1 |〈dF1 |〈d0|〈s0|Uˆ(t2, t1)|µW0 〉|µF1 〉|dW0 〉|dF1 〉|di〉|si〉 × (44)
〈µW0 |〈µF1 |〈dW0 |〈dF1 |〈di|〈si|Uˆ(t1, 0)|µW0 〉|µF0 〉|dW0 〉|dF0 〉|d0〉|s0〉 = 〈s0|[UˆS(τ, 0)]−1|si〉〈si|UˆS(τ, 0)|s0〉
F’s probe probe does not distinguish between the two scenarios shown in Fig. 3, and
neither can F, who may only know if the “measurement of S by D” did take place. Adding
the amplitudes (44) we recover the correct result (42).
P (back to |d0〉|s0〉) = |A1 + A2|2 = P1(back to |d0〉|s0〉). (45)
This is the case of the Feynman’s photon, discussed in Sect.VI, with a difference that now the
photon is always scattered into the same state, regardless of the slit chosen by the electron.
Finding a scattered photon will signal the presence of a passing electron, but since no record
of the path taken will be produced, an interfering pattern will be seen on the screen.
IX. REDUCTION TO THE HILBERT SPACE OF THE SMALLEST SYSTEM.
THE VON NEUMANN’S BOUNDARY
In classical mechanics an observation is expected to yield information about the observed
system “on its own”, i.e., not influenced by being observed. A vestige of this principle in the
19
0	
t1	
t2=2t1	
τ	
Preparation	
Time	
|µW0>|µF0>|dw0>|dF0>|d0>|s0>		
2t1-τ	
|µW0>|µF1>|dw0>|dF1>|d1>|s1>		 |µW0>|µF1>|dw0>|dF1>|d2>|s2>		
|µW1>|µF1>|dW1>|dF1>|d0>|s0>		
Figure 2: Two virtual paths in the interference experiment of Sect.VIII. |dF,Wj 〉 and |µF,Wk 〉,
j, k = 0, 1, 2 are the states of F’s and W’s the probes and memories, respectively.
quantum case is evident, e.g., from Eqs. (23), (36), or (44), where Observer’s probabilities
are expressed in terms of the probability amplitudes ASi , referred to the system, uncoupled
from the probes used to measure it. However, this is as far as the analogy goes. The am-
plitudes are combined differently, depending on whether the probes have been involved or
not. This points towards a possibility of describing the measurements in a manner more
economical than the one used up to now, namely by manipulating the system’s amplitudes
ASi , without referring to the probes’ and the memory’ degrees of freedom, which occupy so
much space, for example, in Fig.1.
The idea is by no means new. In [16] von Neumann pointed out that quantum theory can
successfully avoid analysing an Observer, provided the boundary between the Observer and
the observed system can be displaced arbitrarily. For example, it can be placed between
Observer and his/her memory, M, between the memory and the probe, D, or between the
probe and the system S. The last option allows one to establish a direct correspondence be-
tween an Observer’s experience, and a particular property, which Observer’s theory ascribes
to the system. Next we will apply this to a sequence of more than two measurements, L > 2
relying, as before, on the rules of Sect.II.
For an example, consider the case of Sect.V with a special choice α = 1 and β = 0, so that
the four states in Eq.(16) take the form
|φW1 〉 = |sW1 〉|dF1 〉, |φW2 〉 = −|sW2 〉|dF2 〉, |φW3 〉 = |sW1 〉|dF2 〉, |φW4 〉 = −|sW2 〉|dF1 〉, (46)
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and F’s probe, no longer affected by W’s measurement, continues to carry a record of the
system’s condition as it was at t = τF . The degrees of freedom describing F’s and W’s
memories, and W’s probe, serve only to produce the Kronecker deltas in Eqs.(21) and (28),
and are readily taken into account by considering the paths in the Hilbert space of a smaller
composite {system+F’s probe}, shown in Fig.3a. The paths end in different orthogonal final
states |φWj 〉, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. According to the rules of Sect. II such paths cannot interfere, and
can be endowed with probabilities, which are now the same for all three scenarios of Sect.V
[cf. Eq.(4)],
p(sW1 d
F
1 ← yesF ← dF0 s0) = |AS1 |2 = |〈sW1 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF1 〉〈sF1 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉|2, (47)
p(sW1 d
F
2 ← noF ← dF0 s0) = |AS2 |2 = |〈sW1 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF2 〉〈sF2 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉|2,
p(sW2 d
F
1 ← yesF ← dF0 s0) = |AS3 |2 = |〈sW2 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF1 〉〈sF1 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉|2,
p(sW2 d
F
2 ← noF ← dF0 s0) = |AS4 |2 = |〈sW2 |UˆS(τW , τF )|sF2 〉〈sF2 |UˆS(τF , t0)|s0〉|2.
It is readily seen that the degrees of freedom describing F’s probe are also redundant since
the r.h.s of Eqs.(47) contains only the references to the system which makes transitions
between the states |s0〉, |sFi 〉, and |sWj 〉. Thus, to calculate the probabilities (47) we may as
well use a simpler diagram shown in Fig.3b. The diagram shows all virtual paths connecting
|s0〉 with |sWj 〉 at t = τW , and passing through |sFi 〉 at t = τF , when F’s coupling was
applied. The only consequence of F’s probe being involved is that now the paths leading to
the same final states |sFi 〉 no longer interfere.
This amounts to a general rule. One can apply the prescription of Sect.II to the observed
system, Observers’ probes, and their memories. However, the same probabilities can be
obtained by applying the same prescription directly to the system, represented by virtual
paths in its (smaller) Hilbert space. In this case, the “behind the scenes” presence of the
Observers and their probes is translated into destruction of interference between otherwise
indistinguishable system’s routes. This is, of course, the Feynman’s general rule for ascribing
probabilities to distinguishable scenarios [17].
Observers’ memories, and their probes form the so-called von Neumann’s chains [16]. They
are distinguished by a special type of interaction (67), coupling them to all other degrees of
freedom, which together constitute the observed “system” (cf. Sect. V).
We note next that Eqs.(47) contain no mention of the times t1 and t2, at which F an W
perceive their respective results, and refer instead to the times τF and τW , at which F’s and
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Figure 3: a) Four real paths in the Hilbert space of { system+F’s probe}; b) four virtual paths
in the Hilbert space of the system only. Coupling to F’s probe does not change the values of the
paths amplitudes ASi , but redirects the paths passing through through |sF1 〉 and |sF2 〉 to different
final states in the larger Hilbert space, thus turning them into exclusive alternatives.
W’s respective probes were coupled to the system. In the next Section we will discuss this
lack of reference in more detail.
X. UNITARY EVOLUTION AND THE “IN PRINCIPLE” PRINCIPLE
In the example of the previous Section, F may well decide not to register his probe before
t = t2, i.e., before the experiment is finished. This case is similar to the scenario C of Sect.V
in that there is only one perceived result, t(W’s) which needs to be taken into account when
applying the rules of Sect.II. In general, we can consider L− 1 observers, all coupling their
probes, D`, to a system S, at t = τ`, ` = 1, ...L− 1, according to [cf. Eq.(67)]
|d`0〉|s〉 →
M∑`
m`=1
|d`m`〉pˆim` |s〉. (48)
but failing to register their conditions before t = tL, when the last, L-th, Observer perceives
his/her outcome. In principle, they could do it in the future, or maybe not do it at all.
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Let the L-th observer measure a system’s quantity SL, represented by an operator SˆL =
|sν〉〈sν | whose two eigenvalues are interpreted as S˜L1 = 1 → yesL, S˜L2 = 0 → noL. The
degrees of freedom, which describe the probe and the memory of the L-th Observer, can be
left out of the calculation, as was discussed in the previous Section. For the probability of
the L-th outcome “yes” we, therefore, have
P (yesL) =
M1,...ML−1∑
m1,...mL−1=0
∣∣∣∣∣〈sν |
L−1∏
`=1
〈d`m` |Uˆ(tL, t0)|Φ0〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
, |Φ0〉 ≡ |s0〉|
L−1∏
`′=1
|d`′0 〉, (49)
where the unitary evolution operator Uˆ(tL, t0) accounts for the couplings (48), as well as
for the free evolution of the system S between τ` and τ`−1. The action of Uˆ(tL, t0) is fairly
simple. It decomposes a free system’s state UˆS(tL, t0)|s0〉 into M1×M2...×ML−1 in general
non-orthogonal substates,
UˆS(tL, t0)|s0〉 =
M1,...ML−1∑
m1,...mL−1=1
|s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉, (50)
|s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉 ≡ UˆS(tL, τL−1)
L−1∏
`=1
pˆim`Uˆ
S(τ`, τ`−1)|s0〉
and then “tags” each substate by multiplying it by one of the orthogonal probes’ state
|d1m1〉...|dL−1mL−1〉, so that we have
|Φ(t2)〉 ≡ Uˆ(tL, t0)|Φ0〉 = UˆS(tL, tL−1)
M1,...ML−1∑
m1,...mL−1=1
{
L−1∏
`=1
|d`ml〉
}
|s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉. (51)
Now we can evaluate the matrix elements in Eq.(49), or adopt the view of Sect.III, and
calculate P (yesL) using the state |Φ(t2)〉, obtained by a unitary evolution of |Φ0〉,
P (yesL) = trprobes [|sν〉〈sν ||Φ(t2)〉〈Φ(t2)|] =
M1,...ML−1∑
m1,...mL−1=1
|〈sν |s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉|2. (52)
Reversing the last argument of the previous Section, we note that if the remaining L − 1
Observers, each measuring the system’s operators Sˆ` =
∑M`
m`=1
S˜`m` pˆim` , ` = 1, ...L − 1, did
register there probes and perceived the outcomes in the course of the experiment, i.e., at
τ` < t` < tL, the probability would still be given by Eq.(52),
P (yesL, S˜L−1mL−1 ...S˜
1
m1
) = |〈sν |s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉|2 = |AS(sν ....← S˜`m` ...← s0)|2. (53)
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To arrive at Eq.(53) we have, in fact, used the Feynman’s principle [17]: “If you could”
in principle, “distinguish the alternative final states (even though you don’ bother to do
so), the total, final probability is obtained by calculating the” probability for each state (not
the amplitude) and then adding them together. We applied it to the system’s final states,
|s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉, made distinguishable by the records, carried by the probes beyond the
duration of the experiment, or, if one prefers, by the “tagging” evident in Eq.(51). This
saved us an effort of evaluating a large number of (mostly trivial) matrix elements connecting
the states in the (large) Hilbert space of the composite {system+all probes+all memories},
as would be necessary if the rules of Sect.II were to be applied directly.
Thus, replacing the effect produced by the L−1 intermediate Observers by an uninterrupted
unitary evolution (51) helps simplify the calculation. It may also please the reader, to whom
the “collapse” of a wave function a nuisance, and a potential problem. His/her satisfaction
would not, however, be complete. The need for the last, the L-th, Observer to become
aware of his/her outcome implies projecting the overall state |Φ(t2)〉 onto an orthogonal basis(∏L−1
`=1 |d`ml〉
)
|s0(m1, ...mL−1)〉, and there is nothing we can do about it. Quantum rules of
Sect.II serve to predict statistical correlations between at least two Observers’ experiences
(one of them disguised as “preparation”), and cannot be reduced further [19]. The content
of these rules can, however, provide some insight into the matter. Calculation of matrix
elements of operators between states in abstract Hilbert spaces (which is all that is required)
does not rely on the concept of a constantly evolving “state”. Having a mental picture of such
a state, and worrying about its fate after the L-th observer completes his/her observation, is
just not necessary, if not futile, like wondering about what actually happens to the fictional
personage of a novel, once the last page is turned.
XI. WHERE WE AGREE AND DISAGREE WITH THE CONSISTENT
HISTORIES APPROACH
Another method which uses the sequences of projectors similar to those in Eq.(6) is
the consistent histories approach (CHA) (see [14]), and the Refs. therein), and we will
briefly discuss it here. At first glance, the CHA could not be more different from our
narrative. Indeed, while we aim at defining the probabilities of Observer’s perceptions,
i.e., of “certain (subjective) observations” [16], the CHA, like [18], seeks a “framework for
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reasoning about the properties of closed physical system” [23], and gives no special role to
a conscious Observer. According to the CHA, the probabilities P (QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1)
can be ascribed to a sequence projectors (12) (with L−1 changed to L), provided all partial
evolutions of an initial state |q0〉 result in mutually orthogonal states,
〈q(QLm′L ...← Q
`
m′`
....← Q1m′1)|q(Q
L
mL
...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1)〉 (54)
= δm1m′1 ...δm`m′` ...δmLm′LPCHA(Q
L−1
mL
...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1),
where [cf. Eq.(6)]
|q(QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1)〉 ≡ Uˆ(QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1)|q0〉. (55)
Here we are not interested in the current discussion about the general merits of the CHA [24],
[25], and will comment only on the significance of Eqs.(54) and (55) for our own discourse.
The projectors Πˆ`m` in Eq.(6) can stand for various things, and next we explore some of
the possibilities.
(i) The closed closed system, to which Eq.(54) refers, contains L Observers, with their probes
and memories. If so, we have
Πˆ`m` = |µ`m`〉〈µ`m`| ⊗ |d`m`〉〈d`m`| ⊗ pˆism` , (56)
where the projector pˆism` refers to the system only, and the Uˆ(t`, t`−1) in Eq.(6) accounts for
the system’s free evolution, the coupling of the `-th probe according to
|d`0〉|s〉 →
M∑`
m`=1
|dm`〉pˆim`|s〉, (57)
and for a similar coupling between the probe and the memory [cf. Eq.(13)]. In this case,
the “consistency conditions” (54) are satisfied, and PCHA(Q
L
mL
... ← Q`m` .... ← Q1m1) is just
the probability (5) for the L Observers to perceive their respective outcomes, at t = t`.
(ii) The closed closed system includes the L-th Observer, and L − 1 probes, not registered
before the experiment ends at t = tL. This implies Πˆ
`
m`
= |d`m`〉〈d`m` |⊗ pˆism` , for ` = 1, ...L−1,
and (56) for ` = L. For us the probabilities in Eq.(54), identical to those in Eq.(52), have
no individual meaning, since the L− 1 intermediate outcomes were not perceived. However,
their sum yields the correct odds on the L-th observer perceiving an outcome QLmL ,
P (SLmL) =
M1,...ML−1∑
m1,...mL−1=1
PCHA(Q
L
mL
...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1). (58)
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We can also speculate about what would happen if the remaining L − 1 observers were to
register their (protected) probes and perceive the outcomes after the experiment is finished,
i.e. at τ` > tL.
(iii) The closed system includes only the system S and the consistency conditions (54) are
satisfied. Now we have Πˆ`m` = pˆi
s
m`
and, since no Observers are present, have little to say
about the probabilities PCHA(S˜
L
mL
... ← S˜`m` .... ← S˜1m1). We can, however, speculate about
what would happen if the Observers were to join in. With only the L-th Observer present,
his/her odds on seeing an outcome corresponding to S˜LmL would be
P (QLmL) =
M1,...ML−1∑
m1,...mL−1=1
PCHA(S˜
L
mL
...← S˜`m` ....← S˜1m1). (59)
If the remaining L− 1 Observers were to join in, Πˆ`m` → |µ`m`〉〈µ`m` | ⊗ |d`m`〉〈d`m` | ⊗ pˆism` , the
probabilities of their outcomes would be
P (QLmL ...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1) = PCHA(S˜LmL ...← S˜`m` ....← S˜1m1). (60)
This is a “classical statistical” behaviour [26] - intermediate observations do not affect the
final statistics, and the “which way?” question has an answer. As far as we are concerned, the
consistency condition satisfied by the observed system, only indicates that no interference
would be destroyed by observations of a particular type (but not by observations of any
type), and some vestige of a classical behaviour can be retained.
(iv) The closed system includes only the system S and the consistency conditions (54) are not
satisfied. This is, probably, where our disagreement with the CHA is most evident. In itself,
the failure to satisfy the condition (54) means little to us, since we avoid to make statements
about unobserved systems. We could, however, bring in all L Observers, which would return
us to the case (i). In the enlarged Hilbert space of the composite, the consistency condition
would be satisfied, since the non-orthogonal system’s substates |q(S˜LmL ...← S˜`m` ....← S˜1m1)〉
will acquire orthogonality upon multiplication by |µ`m`〉 ⊗ |d`m`〉. Bringing in only the L-
th observer will yield a different result, with his/her distribution P one(Q
L
mL
) not beeing a
marginal of Pall(Q
L
mL
...← Q`m` ....← Q1m1).
As a brief summary, our relations with the CHA approach can be described s follows.
Suppose the consistency conditions (54) are not satisfied for a closed system, not including
Observers. For the CHA this is the end of the story - for us there is no story, since nothing is
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perceived. We can, however add to the system Observers and their probes, all using the cou-
pling (68). Now we can calculate the probabilities, as in Sect.II - but the CHA can calculates
the same probabilities, now for a larger closed composite { system+probes+memories}.
Suppose next that the conditions (54) are satisfied, the CHA probabilities are available,
and there are still no Observers present - this still means little to us. But if the probes and
Observers are added, the probabilities, calculated in Sect.II for the large composite, will be
the same as the ones computed by the CHA, as an Eq.(54) for the system only.
In other words, from our point of view, the CHA probabilities coincide with those pre-
dicted by the Feynman’s rules of Sect II, whenever the Observers are present, and are not
particularly meaningful in the absence.
Finally, since it is up to the Observers to decide which measurements to make, there are
many possibilities. For this reason, the CHA cannot single out a particular choice of the
projectors Πˆ`m` , without any prior knowledge of Observers’ intentions and must, therefore,
favour all possible “frameworks” in equal measure. The CHA, sometimes deemed to be
an interpretation of quantum theory, has often been criticised for the lack of guidance in
choosing a particular “physical” representation, in which the calculation of the probabilities
in (54) should be made in order to describe the actual experimental occurrences [24]. With
the choices lying with the Observers, no apriori selection would, of course, be possible.
XII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Like every empirical science, quantum mechanics relies on a set of axiomatic rules, which
cannot be explained “from within the theory”. The rules need to be consistent, i.e., pro-
vide a plausible answer to any question within the theory’s area of expertise. A quantum
discourse often contains issues, which prompt researchers to question its consistency. One
such problem is the role and place of a conscious Observer (O). Views on the subject vary
from assigning the consciousness an active role [13], to completely excluding the Observer
from the narrative [14]. Neither of these extreme positions is particularly appealing. On one
hand, quantum mechanics is a theory by and for intelligent Observers. On the other hand,
as a theory about inanimate physical world [16], it is not obliged to provide an insight into
the intelligence of its inventors.
In search of a compromise, the following analogy may be helpful. Tennis is undoubtably a
27
game by and for conscious individuals. A ball would bounce off a wall, or off the player’s
racket. The latter case is much more complex, since it involves the player, who sees the ball,
takes a decision, and makes a deliberate action, all these developments beyond the reach of
classical mechanics. Yet it does not prevent mechanics from calculating the ball’s trajectory,
since the only input the theory needs for its predictions, is the force finally exerted on the
ball.
Thus, one may want to look for something in an act of Observer’s perception, which would
provide enough input for quantum theory to go on, without making it question the inner
workings of Observer’s consciousness. Suppose an act of perception always results in a
change in the state of a material object, destined to carry a record of the perceived outcome
(and does not count if no such record is produced). Quantum theory can discuss material
objects by assigning to them states in an abstract Hilbert space, and specifying their sub-
sequent evolution. Observer’s memory may be such a material object, not to be confused
from the Observer’s consciousness which, we suspect, quantum theory cannot and should
not analyse. Such an assumption does not contradict one’s everyday experiences. A person
is not continuously aware of facts, and usually needs to consult the memory if asked. If
the memory fails, he/she may need to consult a note, or a book - another material record,
which can be looked at without altering its contents. The analogy is now obvious, although
O’s memory, which is always at hand, might enjoy a particularly intimate relationship with
O’s consciousness. Placed at the top of the von Neumann chain of devices, which connects
O’s consciousness to the outside world, it is at the “point at which we must say ‘And this
is perceived by the observer’” [16]. The details are of no concern to quantum theory, only
interested in being able to treat the memory like any other physical object. To complete the
analogy, consider a forgetful Observer, who, conscious of his impediment, decides to make
a note for himself. Being a physicist, he takes a spin in a known initial state, and applies a
magnetic filed to prepare it in a state up along the z-axis, if his experience was a yes, and
down the axis, if it was a no. The spin is well protected from external influences, and its
measurement along the z-axis at a later time, would remind O of what he has seen earlier.
The fact that making such a note required certain conscious decisions on O’s part is of no
consequence to quantum theory. If nothing else is changed, the only thing that matters to
it is that the spin enters the picture, rotated by different angles in the different version of
what happens.
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By making the above assumption, we strike the required balance. On one hand, quantum me-
chanics yields a probability of “an observer making a certain (subjective) observation”[16].
On the other hand, a theorist reasoning about what would be seen in an experiment, is
able to treat all conscious participants as if they were degrees of freedom describing inani-
mate objects. Described in this way, the relationship between Observer’s consciousness and
his/her memory bears a resemblance to the one between a computer’s operating system and
its memory stored in in its hard disc, but only in what relates to his/her experiences of the
physical world. An Observer is free to devise experiments, write poetry, or pray to God -
quantum mechanics cannot be a judge of these matters.
Evolution of an element of the von Neumann chain, connecting O’s memory and the mea-
sured system, need not be different from any other development, and yet not every interac-
tion constitutes a measurement. A suitable coupling of a von Neumann’s type [16], which
entangles Observer’s probe (d) and memory (µ) with the observed system (s) according to
|µ0〉|d0〉|s〉 →
∑
i ci|µi〉|di〉|si〉, is a particular case of a more general interaction, leading to
|µ0〉|d0〉|s〉 →
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k cijk|µk〉|dj〉|si〉. In the former special case, the boundary between
the Observer and the observed system can be moved down the von Neumann chain [16]
including the memory and the probe, and placed at the level of the system. It is then possi-
ble to say that intermediate observations “destroy interference between the system’s virtual
paths”, in the spirit of Feynman’s analysis of the double slit experiment [17], to which we
will return shortly.
A valid illustration of the above is the experiment of Sect.V, where an Observer F mea-
sures a system using a probe, and later another Observer, W, measures a composite
{system + F ′sprobe}. F may look at his probe, or look away, and what he did would
make a difference to what W experiences. This somewhat surprising result can be explained
without granting extra powers to F’s consciousness or intelligence, as was suggested, e.g., in
[13]. If the act of “looking” engages F’s memory, this additional degree of freedom must now
be included into the calculation of W’s odds. At the level of the observed joint system, this
amounts to the destruction of interference between the virtual paths in the Hilbert space of
the composite, which, in turn, causes the disappearance of the interference term, otherwise
present in W’s probabilities.
There are also broader consequences. Firstly, one would need to assume that the entire
body of experimental knowledge about physical world is contained in physical records, e.g.,
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in Observer’s memories and notes, and not in his/her consciousness, on the other side of
the “observer/observed system divide” [16]. It follows logically that with all these material
records destroyed, all knowledge of what actually happened in the physical world would be
irretrievably lost. It follows also that in the example of Sect.V, W’s measurement could
in principle engage (difficult though it may be) also F’s memory, thus depriving F of the
previously gained knowledge about what happen in his experiment. However, destruction of
F’s record by W’s measurement does not lead to a formal contradiction. Wigner correctly
objected to F’s consciousness being in “state of suspended animation” [13], since is contra-
dicts our experience. This objection is lifted if the discussion is centred on F’s memory,
which we expect to differ only in complexity from any other material object.
In his Lectures [17], Feynman pointed out that a photon, scattered by the electron at one of
the slits in a double slit experiment, should destroy the interference pattern even if it is never
detected. Feynman also stressed that many, if not most situations in quantum mechanics
are conceptually similar to the double slit example [17]. This is particularly true for our
discussion. In the scenario B of Sect.V the role of Feynman’s photon was played by the
Observer F, who, having looked at his probe, carries in his memory a record yesF/noF of
his outcome. This is sufficient for W to find no evidence of interference in his results, even
without F telling him what his outcome was, or even with F having no recollection of the
outcome. Not perfectly isolated from its environment, F’s memory may undergo a unitary
evolution, so that his yesF/noF records evolve into a pair of different orthogonal states,
which now include the environment, and as such are no longer recognised by F as valid
recollections. This does not change W’s situation, since his results depend on the presence
oft two orthogonal states ”tagging” the states of the system [cf. Eq.(51)], and not on the
nature of these states.
Feynman’s example [17] has other interesting consequences. Suppose that in the experiment
of Sect V, half way up F’s von Neumann chain (the rest of the chain contains F’s retina,
neurons, etc.) a printer prints either yesF or noF on a piece of paper. W, an extraordinarily
able experimentalist, decides to entangle everything from the system to the printout, using
a pair of states [|yesF 〉 ± |noF 〉]/√2, and a probe coupled to whole lab’s interior. F who is
not in the room, which is sealed to the best of W’s ability, dedicates himself to evaluating
W’s odds. He reckons that if the isolation of the lab is perfect, W’s result will contain an
interference term. If, however, a single photon, missed by W, were to strike the printout on
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a dark spot and be absorbed, if the printed word is yesF , or on a white spot and be reflected,
if the word is noF , W’s interference term will have to disappear. With several photons left
inside, and given a large photon scattering cross section of the macroscopic equipment, F
could think the second scenario to be more likely, and modify his calculation accordingly.
It is often assumed that quantum theory deals with things so small and delicate, that in
any attempt to probe their condition, the condition is inevitably perturbed. In our previous
example, this was not the case. A small and delicate photon appears to affect the state
of something large, classical and fairly robust. This brings us to the second topic of our
discussion. There is also a controversy surrounding the role and status of the quantum wave
function, which stems from the desire to see the outcomes of an experiment in progress as a
reflection on the real-time evolution of certain physical state (or substance), associated with
the observed system. This view was broadly outlined in Sect.III. Moreover, anyone wishing
to make unitary evolution the only basic principle of quantum theory immediately meets
with the problem of “collapse” of a quantum state, be it of a pure, or of a mixed kind. A
sudden decimation of the wave function after an Observer obtains a definite outcome cannot
be described by the Schroedinger equation, and requires an additional “projection postu-
late” [16]. Accepting that a collapse is a physical phenomenon, prompts further questions
about when and how exactly it occurs. One wishing to avoid these questions by preserving
the integrity of the wave function against all odds, may decide to send its unused bits to
parallel universes, as happens, for example, in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics [27]. A comparative analysis of these two viewpoints can be found, for example,
in [18].
We argue that the above problems are artificial. They need not be solved, but can rather
be dismissed once the appropriate terminology is adopted. It is possible to admit the rules
of Sect.II. as a basic principle, and consider Eqs.(6)-(9) of Sect.III to be their derivable
consequences, serving mostly to simplify the calculations. Now Eqs.(2)-(5) are but a tool
used by Alice, not taking part in the experiment herself, to reason about the odds on the
outcomes perceived by the L intelligent Observers, were this experiment to be performed.
Alice knows that the `-th Observer’s inquiry about the system is represented by an operator
Qˆ`, and associates with the system a Hamiltonian HˆS. At the end of each run a sequence of
Observer’s outcomes would be recorded, the numbers of identical records counted, and used
to measure the probabilities which Alice is calculating in the comfort of her office. While
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doing so, Alice is not worried about the Observers’ consciousnesses, since in her calculation
each participant is represented by the degrees of freedom of his/her material memory. It
does not matter to Alice whether the Observers communicate with each other (provided
their memories do not form a part of the measured system). Her job is to evaluate matrix
elements of a unitary operator, Uˆ(t` − t`−1) = exp[−iHˆ(t` − t`−1)], between the eigenstates
of the Qˆ`, representing the Observers’ measurements, multiply them, add the products as
appropriate, and square the moduli of the resulting complex numbers. There is no mention
of a wave function, expected to evolve in a continuous manner, nor any need to look for a
home for its unwanted parts. However, Alice may have noticed that sometimes the formulae
of Sect.III offer an easier way of calculating the probabilities, than the just described basic
procedure. For example, instead of calculating the odds for L Observers she can evaluate, as
we did in Sect.X, the probabilities for a single Observer plus L− 1 probes, already coupled,
but as yet unregistered. This involves matrix elements of a single evolution operator (50)
and is, for this reason, a simpler task. In the process, Alice may begin to put more faith
in the universal value of unitary evolution, but does not have to do so. The rules of Sect.
II serve only to establish statistical correlation between at least two Observers’ experiences,
and cannot be reduced further [19]. In the above example, the L-th Observer’s definite out-
come would “ collapse” the state, making Alice wonder about the destiny of the rest of the
so far unitary evolved wave function. But, as we said, this is by no means necessary. Alice
could as well proclaim “ the experiment finished, the desired probability evaluated” [cf. [17]],
and close her notebook. She would refuse to answer Bob’s question “what happened to the
system after that?” But if asked instead “what would be the results of an L+1-st Observer,
who decides to join the experiment at some tL+1 > tL?”, she would reopen the notebook,
make a new calculation for the entire new series of outcomes, {QL+1mL+1 ...← Q`m` ....← Q0m0},
and then close it again.
In summary, we found elementary quantum mechanics consistent, in the sense of being able
to provide an unambiguous answer at least in the hypothetical situations considered in this
work. The “minimalist” view [19], advocated here, comes at a price of making certain ad-
ditional assumptions. In particular, the theory is deemed to predict statistical correlations
between at least two of the Observer’s “subjective observations” [16], accompanied by pro-
ducing, or consisting in consulting’s a record in the Observer’s material memory. With the
line between Observer’s consciousness and the physical world drawn at the memory’s level,
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Feynman’s general principles [17] need to be applied to the entire duration of the experiment.
The focus is thereby shifted from a continuously evolving wave function to the transition
amplitudes (2)-(3), seen as mere tools of human reasoning. This helps one avoid unfruitful
(in our opinion) discussions about the exact moment in which a quantum state “collapses”
[18], or whether the unused parts of the state found their use in parallel worlds [27].
Expected restrictions on potential applications of quantum theory are also considerable.
Quantum mechanics is not expected to make statements about human consciousness, and
cannot explain how consciousness addresses the memory, or retrieves the memorised infor-
mation from it. With the probabilities referring to humans experiences (actual, or possible
in principle), further questions arise about the theory’s retroductive powers (see e.g., [25]),
as well as about such global concepts as the wave function of the entire Universe.
We will return to these issues in our future work, and conclude with a picture, in which
various Alices and Bobs perform experiments of their choice, perceive the outcomes, mem-
orise and forget, produce and destroy records of their outcomes, wittingly or unwittingly,
and share or not their experiences with each other. In the meantime, Carols (the roles can
of course be exchanged) are evaluating the likelihoods of Alices’ and Bobs’ outcomes, taking
into account only the changes their actions may produce in the inanimate physical world.
XIII. APPENDIX. COUPLING A PROBE TO THE SYSTEM.
Consider a system S in a Hilbert space of a dimension N, and an operator with M ≤ N
distinct eigenvalues S˜m, (∆(x− y) = 1, if x = y, and 0 otherwise)
Sˆ =
N∑
n=1
|sn〉Sn〈sn| =
ML∑
m=1
S˜m
N∑
n=1
∆(S˜m − 〈sn|Sˆ|sn〉)|sn〉〈sn| ≡
ML∑
m=1
S˜mpˆim. (61)
Consider also a probe (a von Neumann’s pointer), a massive particle in one dimension,
with a coordinate q, and a momentum operator (~ = 1) pˆ 〈q′|pˆ|q〉 = −iδ(q − q′)∂q. The
Hamiltonian, coupling the system to the pointer will be Hˆint = pˆSˆδ(t − τ), so that the
evolution operator over a period τ −  < t < τ +  is Uˆ(τ + , τ − ) = exp(−ipˆSˆ) is given by
Uˆ(τ + , τ − ) =
N∑
n=1
∫
dq|q + Sn〉|sn〉〈sn|〈q|. (62)
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Initially, the system and the pointer are described by a product state |Φ0〉 = |s〉|G〉, where
|s〉 =
N∑
n=1
cn|sn〉, and |G〉 =
∫
dqG(q)|q〉, (63)
so that
Uˆ(τ + , τ − )|Φ0〉 =
N∑
n=1
cn|sn〉|G(Sn)〉 = (64)
M∑
m=1
|G(S˜m)〉
N∑
n=1
∆(S˜m − 〈sn|Sˆ|sn〉)cn|sn〉 =
M∑
m=1
|G(S˜m)〉pim|s〉.
where |G(Z)〉 ≡ ∫ dqG(q − Z)|q〉. Let G(q) be a Gaussian of a width ∆q,
G(q) = C exp(−q2/∆q2),
∫
|G(q)|2dq = 1, (65)
and send ∆q to zero, so that 〈G(S˜m′)|G(S˜m)〉 → δmm′ . Although the probe’s Hilbert space
has of infinite dimensions, we will only need its M + 1 orthogonal states,
|d0〉 ≡ |G〉, and |dj〉 ≡ |G(S˜j)〉, j = 1, ...M. (66)
and will describe application of the coupling (62) by saying that “ the system is coupled to
(entangled with) the probe according to”
|d0〉|s〉 →
M∑
m=1
|dm〉pˆim|s〉. (67)
The coupling (62) can be reversed by applying −Hˆint, whose action is defined as
|dj〉pˆij|s〉 → |d0〉pˆij|s〉. (68)
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